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We have this notion that you can gorge on hot dogs, be in a pieeating contest, and drink everyday and society will take care of you.
We can't afford to let individuals drive up costs because they're not
willing to address their health problems.
-Michael

E. Porter, Harvard Business School1

We tried carrots.Carrotsdidn't work.
-Pam Kuryla, Scotts's Health Benefits Executive 2
It's a righteous cause.
-Jim

Hagedorn, Scotts's Chief Executive Officer'
INTRODUCTION

The Scotts Miracle-Gro Company ("Scotts"), a lawn and garden
care products company, had a multi-million dollar problem. It is a
familiar problem facing businesses across North Carolina and
America: how to contain the costs of providing health insurance to
employees Over a four-year period, Scotts's executive team looked
1. Michelle Conlin, Get Healthy-OrElse: Inside One Company's All-Out Attack on
Medical Costs, Bus. WK., Feb. 26, 2007, at 58, 60.
2. Id. at 64.
3. Lydell C. Bridgeford, Pushing the Envelope: Zero Tolerance on Tobacco Use,
EMP. BENEFIT NEWS, June 15, 2008, at 52.
4. Some employers cite health care costs as one of their biggest strategic challenges
and obstacles to growth. See, e.g., Simona Covel, Sick and Getting Sicker, WALL ST. J., July
13, 2009, at R1 ("For entrepreneurs trying to start or run a business, the obstacles are
huge. But few loom as large as one: health care."). Trying to control these costs is not a
task many business executives are eager to perform. See Catherine Arnst, CEOs Secretly
Want Health-Care Reform, Bus. WK. (May 7, 2009, 5:00 PM), http://www.businessweek
.comlmagazine/content/09_20/b4131023543934.htm
(describing
business
leaders'
frustration with their companies' role in the current health care system and their openness
to a public solution).
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on helplessly as the company's annual health care bill ballooned by
forty-two percent to a total of $20 million in 2003. 5 Facing another
twenty percent annual rate hike, Jim Hagedorn, CEO of the
Marysville, Ohio-based corporation, set out on an ambitious,
uncharted course.6 With approval from Scotts's Board of Directors,

Hagedorn declared war on health care spending by implementing one
of the most controversial health and wellness programs in America.
The primary objective in this campaign: rid Scotts of the health care
costs associated with tobacco dependency and obesity by empowering
workers to make better health care decisions.8
As a first step, Hagedorn reviewed a comprehensive health
assessment of Scotts's workforce.9 The survey confirmed his
suspicions about the employees' health: half of Scotts's personnel
were overweight and a quarter smoked cigarettes.1" Hagedorn
resolved that the problems associated with these unhealthy lifestyle
choices called for a radical solution. I
For Scotts, the answer came in the form of a comprehensive
health and wellness program with two key elements. First, in an effort
to improve employee health, Scotts offered perks to its workforce.
The company engaged a vendor to provide on-site primary care and

5. Conlin, supra note 1, at 62. The $20 million in health care expenditures
represented twenty percent of Scotts's net profits in 2003. Id.
6. Id. at 63.
7. "Man you have balls of steel," former General Electric CEO Jack Welch
reportedly told Hagedorn upon learning about Scotts's health and wellness initiative. Id. at
60. After the board approved the overall health and wellness strategy, Lynn J. Beasley,
Chief Operating Officer at Winston-Salem, North Carolina cigarette manufacturer R.J.
Reynolds, and a Scotts's board member since 2003, decided against running for re-election
to the board. Scotts Miracle-Gro Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 7
(Dec. 20, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/825542
/000095015205010095/117362adef14a.htm. Scotts's filing with the SEC stated that Beasley
did not stand for re-election due to "personal reasons." Id. Business Week reported that
Beasley "saw the conflict" between her position at a cigarette manufacturer and Scotts's
new policies and that she "quit the Scotts board" as a result. Conlin, supra note 1, at 63.
These events marked the beginning of Scotts's struggle against tobacco.
8. These two conditions, traceable at least to some extent to lifestyle choices, were
the primary targets in the campaign. See Conlin, supra note 1, at 63 ("Hagedorn ...
wanted to ban smoking and go after obesity."). Business Week did not indicate whether
Scotts attempted to address any other health care targets.
9. Id. at 62.
10. Id. at 62-63.
11. The tactics Hagedorn endorsed were akin to treatment for substance abuse.
According to the Business Week report, Hagedorn "proposed launching the kind of
companywide intervention that families use to help an addicted relative." Id. at 63,
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health coaching services. 12 Scotts also constructed a $5 million dollar,
24,000 square foot wellness facility complete with a fitness center, a
full-time medical staff, and a drive-through window with free generic
prescription drugs.' 3 Second, Scotts crafted a policy to enforce its

commitment to health and wellness. Employees who refused to take a
health assessment and follow the recommendations of their health
coach were charged an additional amount in their monthly health
insurance premiums." Then, in its boldest move, Scotts instituted a
no-tobacco policy. Under the new policy, effective October 1, 2006,
Scotts refused to hire tobacco users. 5 Current employees were
offered the chance to participate in Scotts's smoking cessation
program. 16 If they continued to use tobacco, they would be

dismissed. 7 Scotts's message to its employees was clear: we will give
you all the necessary tools to make healthy lifestyle choices, but if you
choose to continue to engage in destructive behavior and saddle us
12. Id. Scotts selected Whole Health Management to be the third party administrator
of its health and wellness management program. Id. at 64. Walgreens acquired Whole
Health Management in 2008. Press Release, Walgreens, Walgreens Creates New Health
and Wellness Division as Part of Strategic Move to Expand Health Care Access Beyond
Retail Sites (Mar. 17, 2008), availableat http://news.walgreens.com/article-print.cfm
?articleid=4917. Walgreens markets health and wellness management services to
employers through a wholly owned subsidiary called Take Care Health Employer
Solutions ("Take Care"). See Our Company, TAKE CARE HEALTH EMPLOYER
SOLUTIONS, http://www.takecareemployersolutions.com/company.html (last visited Dec.
29, 2011). Take Care reports a return on investment ("ROI") of 60% and 100%,
respectively, for programs it implemented for two clients in the energy industry. ROJ,
TAKE CARE HEALTH EMPLOYER SOLUTIONS, http://www.takecareemployersolutions
.com/ROI.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). Take Care also claims to save Sprint Nextel
more than $1 million annually. Id.
13. Conlin, supra note 1, at 64. The wellness program costs Scotts $4 million a year to
operate. Id. at 69. The Wellness Center is available to company employees and their
dependents. Our Campus, THE SCOTrS MIRACLE-GRO Co., http://
thescottsmiraclegrocompany.comc/areers/our_campus.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). In
addition to having access to the wellness facility, Scotts employees are eligible to compete
"for trips to Hawaii, free massages and facials, and other cash and prizes" as part of a plan
to encourage workers to go to the gym. Conlin, supranote 1, at 64.
14. Employees who refused to abide by Scotts's policy could have paid up to $107 per
month more in health insurance premiums. See Conlin, supra note 1, at 64 ("Those who
balk [at completing a health assessment] pay $40 a month more in premiums. Using datamining software, Whole Health analysts scour the physical, mental, and family health
histories of nearly every employee and cross-reference that information with insuranceclaims data. Health coaches identify which employees are at moderate to high risk. All of
them are assigned a health coach who draws up an action plan. Those who don't comply
pay $67 a month on top of the $40.").
15. Id. at 60.
16. To help current smokers quit their habit, Scotts offered to "pay[] for counseling,
Nicorette, prescription drugs, [and] hypnosis." Id.
17. Id.
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with the costs, we will ask you to leave.' 8 In other words, get healthy
or get out. Scotts's policy worked. The rate of tobacco use at Scotts
plunged from 30% to 8%.19

In September 2006, a Scotts lawn care technician named Scott
Rodrigues learned just how serious Scotts was about its new health
and wellness program. Scotts informed Rodrigues of its tobacco
policy.20 After a drug screening showed that Rodrigues had nicotine
in his system, Scotts fired him.2 1 Rodrigues filed suit against Scotts in
federal court alleging that his dismissal violated Massachusetts state
employment laws and certain provisions of the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").22 In Rodrigues

v. EG Systems, Inc.,23 the district court granted summary judgment to
Scotts on both the state and federal law claims. 24 Rodrigues initially
sought to appeal the decision to the First Circuit Court of Appeals,25
but the parties ultimately reached a settlement.26 The case drew
national attention in part because of its implications for organizations
that may try to follow a similar path to Scotts. Macy's and PepsiCo

18. See id. at 64 (" 'If people understand the facts and still choose to smoke, it's
suicidal,' [Hagedorn] says. 'And we can't encourage suicidal behavior.' ").
19. Bridgeford, supra note 3, at 52.
20. Conlin, supra note 1, at 60.
21. Sacha Pfeiffer, Off-the-Job Smoker Sues Over Firing-Says Company Policy is a
Slippery Slope, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2006, at Al.
22. See Second Amended Complaint and Jury Trial Demand, Rodrigues v. EG Sys.,
Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2009) (No. 07-10104-GAO), 2007 WL 2383241; see also
ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (making it unlawful "to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan"); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 12, § 11I (LexisNexis 2000) (providing a private right of action for those
deprived of their rights under the U.S. and Massachusetts Constitutions); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (LexisNexis 2011) ("A person shall have a right against unreasonable,
substantial or serious interference with his privacy.").
23. 639 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D. Mass. 2009).
24. The district court held that Rodrigues's claim under Massachusetts privacy law
failed because his smoking habit was not private. See id. at 134 ("Rodrigues does not have
a protected privacy interest in the fact that he is a smoker because he has never attempted
to keep that fact private."). The court also denied Rodrigues's claim under ERISA
because Scotts's offer of permanent employment to Rodrigues was contingent on him
completing a pre-hire screening process. Id. at 135. Thus, according to the district court,
Rodrigues did not have a cognizable expectation of employment benefits under ERISA.
Id. at 136.
25. Jonathan Saltzman, Smoker Who Lost Job Loses in Court-Judge Sides with
Lawn Care Firm, BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 8,2009, at B1.
26. E-mail from Harvey Schwartz, Of Counsel, Rodgers Powers & Schwartz LLP, to
James Ruffin Lawrence, III (Aug. 31, 2011) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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have added health insurance surcharges for employees who smoke.
The City of Chicago has announced that it will require city workers to
enroll in a health and wellness program or pay an extra fifty dollars
per month in health insurance premiums.28 Other employers, such as
Union Pacific, Cleveland Clinic, Weyco, and community fire
departments, like Scotts, simply refuse to hire smokers.2 9

While Rodrigues did not provide any definitive guidance on the
fate of these particular programs, one thing is certain: the case would
have come out much differently under North Carolina law. Section

95-28.2 of the North Carolina General Statutes (here referred to as
the "Smoker's Protection Act") forbids an employer from
discriminating in employment decisions based on a person's use of
27. As of July 1, 2011, Macy's added a $420 annual health insurance surcharge for
workers who smoke cigarettes. Pat Wechsler, And You Thought Cigarettes Were Pricey,
Bus. WK., July 4, 2011, at 24, 24-25. PepsiCo requires smokers to pay an additional $600
per year for health care benefits. Id. at 25.
28. John Byrne, Emanuel to City Workers: Use 'Wellness Plan' or Pay More for
Insurance,CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-16/news
/chi-emanuel-to-city-workers-use-wellness-plan-or-pay-more-for-insurance-20110916-1
_mayor-rahm-emanuel-wellness-plan-health-care. Explaining the rationale for the policy,
Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel stated: "You can't ask the public to pay for something
that you need to take responsibility (for). We will help you be a good steward of your
health, but if you choose not to, you'll pay that price, and that's the price you'll pay." Id.
Emanuel also estimated the program would save taxpayers in excess of $20 million in its
first year. Andrea L. Brown & Elizabeth Owens-Schiele, Emanuel Wants City Workers to
be Big Losers, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 28, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-0928/news/ct-x-0928-workplace-wellness-20110928 1 wellness-program-mayor-rahmemanuel-deputy-mayor-mark-angelson. The City of Chicago spent $365 million on health
care in 2009 with "nearly half of those claims result[ing] from eight leading chronic
illnesses." Id.
29. Union Pacific has refused to hire smokers for a number of years. A.G. Sulzberger,
Hospitals Shift Smoking Bans to Smoker Bans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at Al.
Cleveland Clinic, which decided to stop hiring smokers in 2007, may have started a trend
against hiring smokers for positions at hospitals. Id. According to industry observers,
"hospitals in Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee
and Texas, among others, stopped hiring smokers" in 2010. Id. The Baylor Health Care
System will start excluding smokers from its applicant pool in 2012. Ananda Boardman,
City Smokers Burn Over Baylor Ban, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 23, 2011, at B1.
Beginning on January 1, 2005, Weyco, a Michigan-based company that administers
employee benefits, instituted a no-tobacco policy for its workforce. See 60 Minutes: Whose
Life is it Anyway? (CBS television broadcast Oct. 30, 2005) (providing interviews of
terminated employees and Weyco President Howard Weyers). Under the new policy,
employees who failed a nicotine test would be terminated. Jeremy M. Peters, Company's
Smoking Ban Means Off-Hours, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at Cl. Some local fire
departments have started to require their firefighters to refrain from smoking or chewing
tobacco off-duty. See Blythe Bernhard, Fire District Bans Smoking, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, July 9, 2009, at Al. Other organizations promote health and wellness through
a combination of fitness facilities and peer pressure. See Sue Shellenbarger, Let the Boss
Really See You Sweat, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 23, 2011, at Dl.
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tobacco products off-duty and after work hours.3" Under North
Carolina law, Scott Rodrigues would have obtained damages and a
court order requiring Scotts to reinstate his employment.3 ' Thus,
Rodrigues would be free to continue his tobacco habit and, under the
full force of the law, Scotts would be required to continue providing
Rodrigues with health care benefits.32
This Comment rejects that result. It maintains that the Smoker's
Protection Act is an affront to freedom of contract in the labor
market, that it unjustifiably limits the ability of North Carolina firms
to pursue health and wellness programs, and that it gives tobacco
addiction the support of North Carolina law. This Comment argues
that the Act should be repealed as it represents an illegitimate
intrusion by state government into employment freedom of contract
and corporate governance in North Carolina. Ostensibly in the name
of personal liberty and privacy, the Smoker's Protection Act infringes
on freedom of contract by creating an unwarranted exception to
North Carolina's at-will employment doctrine, a regime that
recognizes the right to terminate an employment relationship on
essentially any grounds. In addition to being an attack on freedom of
contract, this Comment argues that by forbidding employers from
considering personal smoking habits in employment decisions, the
State of North Carolina subsidizes tobacco dependency by forcing
employers to shoulder the burden of insuring smokers. This means
the Act promotes inconsistent, Januslike33 public policy in North
Carolina, where state government decries the negative public health
effects of tobacco at the same time as it elevates cigarette smoking to
a civil right. Treating smokers as a protected class prevents employers
from requiring smokers to absorb the full, true costs of their tobacco
addiction and forces others to subsidize their habit.
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2011).
31. § 95-28.2(e). Rodrigues would have been entitled to lost wages, § 95-28.2(e)(1),
and reinstatement of his employment, § 95-28.2(e)(2). As the prevailing party in litigation,
Rodrigues could have also recovered reasonable attorney's fees and court costs from
Scotts. § 95-28.2(f).
32. Once a person becomes an employee, ERISA requires that health benefits be
made available. See ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant
or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan ... ").
33. To behave in a Januslike manner means "looking or acting in opposite or
contrasting ways." 1 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1209 (1993).
Janus was the god of beginnings and endings in Roman mythology. 5 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Vol. VIII, 189 (1989). Janus was depicted as having two faces, one
looking forward and the other looking backward. Id.
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This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the
economic and business justifications for corporate health and wellness
programs. It explores why, in the American system of health care
finance, employers are trying to influence the health care choices of
employees. Part II examines the origins and intent of North
Carolina's Smoker's Protection Act. It chronicles how an odd political
alliance between the tobacco industry and the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") played an important role in persuading
the North Carolina General Assembly to enact this legislation. Part
III considers the provisions of the Smoker's Protection Act, paying
particular attention to how the statute modifies North Carolina's atwill employment doctrine. The Act is also analyzed from the
perspective of how the statute interacts with federal law, including the
recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
("PPACA"), 4 to limit North Carolina employers' liberty to pursue
effective health and wellness strategies. Finally, Part IV makes the
case for repealing the Smoker's Protection Act and calls for a return
to employment freedom of contract in North Carolina.
I. WHY EMPLOYEE HEALTH MATTERS TO EMPLOYERS:
UNDERSTANDING THE RATIONALE FOR CORPORATE HEALTH AND
WELLNESS PROGRAMS

A.

The Role of Private Employers in Health Care Financein the
United States
Accounting for the growth of corporate health and wellness
programs starts with understanding the role employers play in the
American system of health care finance. In the United States, health
care is paid for through three primary channels: Medicare, Medicaid,
and private employers.35 Medicare provides health insurance

34.
(2010)
(Supp.
35.

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A. (2011) and 21, 25, 29, & 42 U.S.C.A.
2011)).
See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH,

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN

THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 71 (2010), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs
/p60-238.pdf (reporting that 55.8% of Americans received health insurance through a plan
sponsored by a private employer, 15.7% obtained coverage through Medicaid, and 14.3%
received coverage through Medicare in 2009). Others obtained health insurance by
purchasing it directly from health insurance companies (8.9% of Americans) or through
service in the military (4.1% of Americans). Id. Nearly 17% of Americans were uninsured
in 2009. Id.
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coverage to the elderly while Medicaid insures the poor.36 Of the
remaining Americans under the age of sixty-five, a majority obtain
health insurance through a private employer.37 In this arrangement,
both employers and employees make a financial contribution toward
a worker's monthly health insurance premium.38 This employer-based
model of health care finance is supported by favorable federal tax
treatment.39
36. Created in 1965, Medicaid and Medicare are a legacy of President Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society. Overview History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/History/ (last updated Dec. 19, 2011). Americans over the age of
sixty-five are generally eligible for assistance under Medicare. See OriginalMedicare (Part
A and B) Eligibility and Enrollment Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/OrigMedicarePartABEligEnrol/ (last updated July 13, 2011)
(describing eligibility criteria for Medicare medical benefits). Those who meet certain
means-tested criteria are eligible to receive support through Medicaid. See Medicaid
Eligibility Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov
/MedicaidEligibility/ (last updated Aug. 11, 2011) (describing eligibility criteria for
Medicaid coverage).
37. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 35, at 22 (reporting that in 2009 55.8% of
Americans received health insurance through a plan sponsored by a private employer).
The proportion of Americans receiving employer-based health insurance in 2009 was the
lowest since 1993. See id. at 71 (reporting that 57.1% of Americans obtained health
insurance through a private employer in 1993). This is likely a consequence of high
unemployment due to the 2008 financial crisis.
38. In its annual survey of employer health benefit practices, the Kaiser Family
Foundation found that the average annual premium for an employer-sponsored family
health insurance plan increased by almost 114% from $6,438 in 2000 to $13,770 in 2010.
THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2010, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUND.], available at
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2010/8085.pdf. From 2000 to 2010, the average employer
contribution to a worker's annual premium for a family health insurance plan more than
doubled from $4,819 to $9,773. Id. At the same time, the corresponding employee
contribution increased from $1,619 in 2000 to $3,997 in 2010, or nearly 147%. Id.
39. The Internal Revenue Code excludes employer contributions to employersponsored health plans from an employee's gross income. See 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006).
For a discussion of the policy issues raised by this exclusion, see generally BOB LYKE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34767, THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR EMPLOYER-PROVIDED
HEALTH INSURANCE: POLICY ISSUES REGARDING THE REPEAL DEBATE (2008). For a
short history of the employer-based health care finance system, see generally David
Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States-Origins and
Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82 (2006) (attributing the rise of employer-based
health insurance initially to labor and wage controls during World War II and
subsequently to favorable tax treatment).
Extensive government involvement in subsidizing the employer-sponsored system
makes some of the more strident anti-government planning rhetoric in the debate leading
up to the passage of the PPACA at least somewhat ironic. The same is true for the claims
that passing the PPACA presented a decisive, Waterloo moment for a free market health
care system in the United States. See, e.g., Dick Morris & Eileen McGann, Urgent Action
Needed on Health Care, DICKMORRIS.COM (July 17, 2009), http://www.dickmorris.com
Iblog/urgent-action-needed-on-health-care/ ("The stakes have never been higher."). Yet
the realities of the American health care system stand in stark contrast to this bombastic
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There are two models of employer-sponsored health insurance.

In the first, employers independently provide insurance to
employees." These self-insured employers absorb health care costs as
their workers utilize health care services.4 These plans are governed
by ERISA, which preempts state law.42 In the second model of
political rhetoric. Consider just a few characteristics of our allegedly free market
approach: occupational licensing laws erect barriers to entry, putting government between
patients and potential providers. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-18(a) (2011) (making it a
crime to practice medicine in North Carolina without a government license). The United
States Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") must approve new drugs before they can
be sold on the market. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006) (prohibiting any person from entering
into "interstate commerce any new drug, unless" approved by FDA). Government
mandates the medical conditions health insurers must cover in their policy offerings. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-67-74(a) (2011) (mandating coverage for diabetes). Finally,
around three in every ten Americans already finance their care through government
programs. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 35, at 71 (reporting that, in 2009,
15.7% and 14.3% of Americans received health insurance coverage through Medicaid and
Medicare, respectively).
Whatever this system is, it is far from free, guided only by the invisible hand. On
the contrary, American health care bears the hallmarks of the planned economy, riddled
with regulation and increasingly socialized. Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe describes the
result:
[T]he socialization of the health care system through institutions such as Medicaid
and Medicare and the regulation of the insurance industry (by restricting an
insurer's right of refusal: to exclude any individual risk as uninsurable, and
discriminate freely, according to actuarial methods, between different group risks)
[has created] a monstrous machinery of wealth and income redistribution at the
expense of responsible individuals and low-risk groups in favor of irresponsible
actors and high-risk groups ....
HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, DEMOCRACY: THE GOD THAT FAILED 196 (2001).
40. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that 55% of American workers were
insured through a partially or totally self-insured employer in 2008. THE KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2008, at 155 (2008), available at http://ehbs.kff
.org/pdf/7790.pdf. Self-insured employers are typically larger. See id. (reporting that, in
2008, 12% of employers with 5-199 workers were self-insured, compared to 47% of
employers with 200-999 workers, 76% with 1,000-4,999 workers, and 89% with 5,000 or
more workers).
41. Self-insured firms "act[] as [their] own insurer." Paul Fronstin, Capping the Tax
Exclusion for Employment-Based Health Coverage: Implications for Employers and
Workers, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Jan. 2009, at 1, 6, availableat http://www.ebri.org/pdf
/briefspdf/EBRIIB 1-2009_TaxCapl.pdf. In other words, self-insured firms must forecast
health care expenditures and allocate portions of their budgets to defray future costs.
These firms typically contract with a third party administrator to manage employee health
care claims and the reimbursement process. Id. at 7. Since they do not purchase insurance
through a third party, these employers "bear[] the risk associated with offering health
coverage." Id.
42. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006) ("[T]his chapter shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this
title."). The fact that ERISA contains a strong preemption provision has been described as
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employer-sponsored health insurance, an employer purchases a
health plan from a health insurance company.43 These plans are
governed primarily by state law and are subject to extensive state
regulation." This means that unlike their self-insured counterparts,
firms that choose this model of insurance are more restricted in the
way they can structure employee benefits.
B.

The Business Casefor Health and Wellness Programs

1. Health Care Market Dynamics and the Basic Business Case
Given the steady increase in health insurance premiums 45 and the
inevitable impact of this trend on balance sheets, it is not surprising
that firms would try to limit the costs of providing employees with
health care. This was the dilemma facing Scotts. As a self-insured
firm, Scotts could (1) continue to try to absorb the costs of rising

an advantage for self-insured employers who are thought to have more freedom to
customize and tailor their employee benefits. See Fronstin, supra note 41, at 6-7
(describing self-insured employers, particularly larger employers with operations in
multiple states).
43. These plans are generally referred to as fully-insured plans. See Fronstin, supra
note 41, at 6. The Employee Benefits Research Institute estimates that in 2008, 45% of
employers provided health insurance to their workers through a fully-insured model. Id.
This is the most common form of health insurance provided by small firms. See KAISER
FAMILY FOUND., supra note 38, at 155 (reporting that only 12% of employers with 3-199
workers were self-insured, meaning that 88% of insured workers would have received
coverage through a fully-insured model). In North Carolina, Blue Cross Blue Shield of
North Carolina ("BCBSNC") is by far the largest player in the private health insurance
market. See James Gallagher, BCBSNC Dominates N.C. Insurance Pie, TRIANGLE Bus.
J., Oct. 2, 2009, at 1, availableat http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2009/10/05
/story2.html (reporting that BCBSNC "took in nearly 70 percent of all dollars spent on
health insurance premiums in North Carolina in 2008"). United Healthcare and WellPath
Select accounted for over half of the remainder of the private health insurance market. Id.
44. The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that insurance regulation is primarily the
province of the states. McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2006). The
McCarran-Ferguson Act "declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States." § 1011. Since 1899, the North Carolina
Department of Insurance has regulated the insurance industry in North Carolina. About
the North CarolinaDepartment of Insurance, N.C. DEP'T OF INS., http://www.ncdoi.com
/main.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). For additional background on the origins of state
regulation of the insurance industry, see Susan Randall, Insurance Regulationin the United
States: Regulatory Federalismand the NationalAssociation of Insurance Commissioners, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 629-34 (1999) (describing the development of state regulation of
the insurance industry beginning with the Supreme Court of the United States's decision
in Paulv. Virginia,75 U.S. 168 (1869)).
45. See supra note 38 (noting the rapid rise in health insurance premiums and the
increased employer share of expenses).

2012]

"LET US NOW TRY LIBERTY"

health insurance premiums at the risk of compromising its
competitive position in the marketplace,46 (2) require employees to
make an increased contribution to their health insurance premium, or
(3) attempt to make Scotts's workforce a more attractive, low-risk
pool of employees to insure by pursuing a health and wellness
program with the goal of limiting the cost of unhealthy lifestyle
choices.47

Scotts, like other companies facing a similar predicament, 48 chose
the third course. As Professor M. Todd Henderson explained in his
account of the rise of so-called "corporate nannyism," taking this
route epitomizes rational economic behavior for firms:
It is in ...cost bearing by third parties that nannyism starts.

Third parties who are liable for the costs imposed by others will
inevitably engage in actions designed to reduce those costs. In
fact, it would be irrational for the third parties not to try to
influence the behavior of the individuals imposing the costs,
since it would be subsidizing socially inefficient conduct.49

Firms that provide health care benefits to employees are the kind of

third parties to which Professor Henderson refers. At some point
these organizations50 inevitably absorb the costs of an employee's
health care choices.
The costs tobacco addicts impose on firms are significant. A
study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC")
found that in the late 1990s, the average additional annual cost of
46. This competitive position would include Scotts's stock price since it is a publicly
traded company. Scotts is thought to be one of the few public companies pursuing its
brand of health and wellness strategy. According to Scotts's CEO Jim Hagedorn, "[public
companies] want to play where it's really safe" and are timid about pursuing cutting-edge
health and wellness programs. Michelle Conlin, Online Extra: Hagedorn: "We Care About
Our People", Bus. WK. (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content
/07_09/b4023005.htm.
47. In this sense, self-insured firms have the same basic strategic position as insurance
companies generally. Insurance is "[a] contract by which one party (the insurer)
undertakes to indemnify another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or
liability arising from the occurrence of some specified contingency." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009). Insurance thus involves pooling and effectively managing
risks posed by uncertain future events and expenses.
48. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (describing anti-tobacco policies at
various organizations).
49. M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1528
(2009).
50. These costs can take the form of both direct and indirect costs. Direct costs
involve medical care attributable to health care choices. Indirect costs refer to worker
absenteeism caused by illness and lost workplace productivity. This Comment considers
both.
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employing a smoker was $3,383."' After adjusting for inflation, this
figure amounts to $4,570.64 in additional annual costs per smoker in
5 2
2011 dollars.
2. The Economics of Smoking in North Carolina
Extrapolating from the CDC study,53 Table 1 attempts to
summarize the economic impact of smoking on a typical North
Carolina firm.54
Table 1: FinancialImpact of Smoking on an Average-Sized North
CarolinaFirm (Medical Costs Indexed to GeneralRate of Inflation)
Average annual cost of smoking per employee (adjusted for
inflation in USD)
Average size of a North Carolina employer (number of
workers)

$4,570.64
20

51. As compared to non-smokers, smokers typically use more health care services and
are prone to increased absenteeism. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Annual
Smoking-Attributable Mortality, Years of PotentialLife Lost, and Economic Costs-United
States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 300, 302 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5114a2.htm (finding the average annual
productivity costs of smoking to be $1,760 and the average annual increased medical costs
for a smoker to be $1,623, for a total of $3,383 in increased annual costs based on data
from 1998). From this CDC estimate, Professor Henderson used mass retailer Wal-Mart as
a case study on which to extrapolate the costs of smoking. See Henderson, supra note 49,
at 1545 (finding that Wal-Mart could save $1.4 billion in health care costs if it instituted "a
zero-tolerance policy for smoking").
52. The adjustment for inflation was made in January 2011 using the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Inflation Calculator. See CPI Inflation Calculator,BUREAU OF
LABORATORY STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflationcalculator.htm (last visited Dec.
29, 2011). The calculation was performed by setting the initial year to 1998 and the preadjusted amount to $3,383. The amount, adjusted to January 2011 dollars, comes out to
$4,570.64 on the inflation calculator.
53. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 51, at 302.
54. Using a similar method to Professor Henderson, assuming a twenty percent
smoking rate, an average-sized North Carolina firm absorbs $18,282.56 in additional
annual costs due to tobacco use. See Statistics of U.S. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www2.census.gov/econ/susb/data/2008/us-state-totals_2008.xls (last visited Dec. 29,
2011). This figure is arrived at by multiplying the average annual cost of smoking by the
average number of North Carolina employees who smoke per firm.

"LET US NOW TRY LIBERTY"

20121

Estimated percentage of North Carolinians who smoke
cigarettes

20%

55

Average number of North Carolina employees who smoke
per firm

4

Average annual cost of smoking to North Carolina

$18,282.56

employers (adjusted for inflation in 2011 USD)

I

_

I

Table 1 provides a conservative estimate of the costs of smoking
imposed on a firm because it is based on the assumption that the
rising rate of medical costs tracks the average general rate of
inflation. Yet there is a substantial body of empirical evidence that
indicates this is not the case.56 In fact, evidence suggests that health
care costs greatly outpace the average rate of inflation.57 Table 2
presents an estimate of the costs of smoking for North Carolina firms
based on this estimated adjusted rate.58
Table 2: FinancialImpact of Smoking on an A veraged-Sized North
CarolinaFirm (Costs Indexed to Rate of Rising Health Care Costs)
Average annual cost of smoking per 5employee
(adjusted for
rising health care costs in 2011 USD) 9

$6,791.82

Average size of a North Carolina employer (number of
workers)

20

55. The Kaiser Family Health Foundation estimates that nearly 20% of North
Carolina adults smoke cigarettes, which is over 2% higher than the national average. See
Kaiser Family Health Found., North Carolina: Percent of Adults Who Smoke, 2010,
STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/profileind.jsp?ind=80&cat=2
&rgn=35 (last visited Dec. 29, 2011) (estimating the percentage of North Carolina adult
smokers at 19.8% as compared to the U.S. average of 17.2%); see also KENDRA A.
HOVEY & HAROLD A. HOVEY, CQ'S STATE FACt FINDER 2007, at 246 (2007) (reporting

that 22.6% of North Carolina adults smoked cigarettes in 2005, a rate 2% higher than the
U.S. average of 20.6 %).
56. See, e.g., Jeanne Sahadi, Family Health Costs Jump 5%, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept.
15, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/15/news/economy/health-insurance-costs/index
.htm.
57. See id. (reporting an 8.7% annual increase in health care costs since 1999 and that
"[i]n each of the past 10 years, insurance increases have outpaced inflation--sometimes by
as much as 11 percentage points").
58. In Table 2, the rate is assumed to be 8% per year, which is a conservative estimate
based on the 8.7% average annual increase. Id.
59. This figure is the sum of productivity costs ($1,760 in 1998, adjusted for inflation)
and medical costs ($1,623 in 1998, compounded 8% annually).

524

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.90

Estimated percentage of North Carolinians who smoke
cigarettes6°

20%

Average number of North Carolina employees who smoke
per firm

4

Average annual cost of smoking to North Carolina
employers (adjusted for rising health care costs in 2011

$27,167.28

USD) 61

I

_

I

Table 1 and Table 2 together suggest that employees who use
tobacco impose approximately $18,000 to $27,000 in additional costs
on average-sized North Carolina firms. In per employee terms, this
means North Carolina firms pay an estimated 12% to 18% premium
over and beyond normal payroll costs for each smoker.62 From an
aggregate perspective, tobacco addicts impose an estimated $3.2 to
$4.8 billion in annual direct and indirect costs on North Carolina's
private sector. 63

3. Even with a Business Case, Active Employers Are an Exception
Given the costs associated with tobacco use, it is somewhat
surprising that aggressive health and wellness programs like the one

60. For estimates on North Carolina smoking rates, see Kaiser Family Health Found.,
supra note 55.
61. This figure is the product of the average annual cost of smoking ($6,791.82) and
the average number of employed smokers at a North Carolina firm (four).
62. The 12% to 18% premium (P,,,,,) was determined according to the following
equation:

Pmkr

SP10 W

SPhigh

1

[Payroll per employee' Payrollper employee]

Here, total payroll spending by employers per employee (Payrollper employee) in North
Carolina is $36,930.59, the most conservative estimate for the cost of smoking (SP,,,) in
2011 dollars is $4,570.64, and the cost of smoking adjusted for medical inflation (SPh) is
$6,791.82. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 54; see also supra text accompanying notes
50-59.
63. This figure, the aggregate cost of smoking (C&,,, is arrived at according to the
following equation:
CSaggreaate = [ENc * SPow * NCsmoke%, ENc * SPhigh * NCsmoke%]
Where total North Carolina employment (Ec) is 3.5 million workers, a conservative
estimate of the cost of smoking (SPo) is $4,570.64, the cost of smoking adjusted for
medical inflation (SPgh) is $6,791.82, and the estimated percent of North Carolinians that
smoke cigarettes (NC,,,,) is twenty percent. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 54; see
also supra text accompanying notes 51-59.
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at Scotts are not more commonplace. 64 There are at least three

possible explanations for this. First, a firm may lack the economies of
scale necessary to receive an adequate return on investment on a
health and wellness program. Unless a firm has enough employees,
and thus a significant opportunity to capture cost savings from
limiting tobacco use by its employees, it will be difficult to justify the
financial investment required to establish a rigorous health and
wellness program. 65 Second, firms may decide against pursuing a
rigorous wellness program for fear of suffering backlash from current
employees and the labor market, in addition to incurring the scorn
and ridicule of consumers and media outlets.66 Third, in jurisdictions
with laws that forbid employment discrimination against tobacco
users, firms are severely limited in the costs they can pass on to
tobacco addicts.67 These laws, and the relative uncertainty pertaining
64. The Kaiser Family Foundation's annual survey of health benefits found that 74%
of private employers provide their employees with some form of wellness program. See
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 38, at 170. However, only 1% of surveyed firms
varied their contribution to health insurance premiums based on an employee's
participation in a wellness program. Id.
65. Recall that the initial, fixed investment in the Scotts wellness program was at least
$5 million, in addition to $4 million in recurring annual costs. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. Applying the financial modeling methods described above at supra
note 63, it is conceivable that Scotts's no-tobacco policy is saving the company $5.6 million
annually. This more than pays for the annual operating costs of the Scotts wellness facility.
Assuming a potential costs savings of $4,570.64 per smoker per year from instituting a notobacco policy, Scotts would cover the annual costs of its wellness facility with a workforce
of 3,633. This helps to explain why large employers have been more likely to pursue health
and wellness programs than smaller ones. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 38, at
176 (finding employers with 200 or more workers were the most likely to offer health
insurance premium discounts in connection with health and wellness programs). Firms
may also balk at starting a health and wellness program because of the time required to
realize any return. On this point, in 2008, Scotts CEO Jim Hagedorn noted it could take
"up to three to five years" before such an initiative generates a financial return.
Bridgeford, supra note 3, at 52.
66. Some consumers responded negatively to Scotts's program. One called the policy
"shameful" and vowed to "never buy Scotts's products again." Bob Bevill, Letter to the
Editor, Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 2007, at 82, 82. Another called the program a "creepy abuse of
power." Anne Jones, Letter to the Editor, Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 2007, at 83, 83. After the
Baylor Health Care System announced its new no-tobacco policy, one local media
commentator remarked that "Baylor's new policy crosses a line." Ashley Sanchez, Baylor
Crosses Line with 'No Smoking' Rule, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, (Sept. 29, 2011,
7:24 PM), http://www.statesman.com/opinion/sanchez-baylor-crosses-line-with-no-smoking
-rule-1887230.html?extype=rss-ece-frontpage. Indeed, this particular critique maintained
that the inexcusable defect with the policy was that it treated job applicants "like toddlers
by telling them what they have to do." Id. But see Editorial, Baylor's Preventive Measure,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 28, 2011, at A12 (calling the Baylor policy "refreshing"
while praising the health care provider for "acting sensibly").
67. These anti-discrimination employment laws are discussed in further detail in Part
III infra.
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to their application, may be responsible for producing a chilling effect
on the willingness of firms to engage in proactive, strategic thinking
about managing employee health care benefits.68
C. Beyond the Balance Sheet: Health and Wellness Programsand
CorporateSocial Responsibility

Academic debate continues as to the appropriate role of the firm
in society. Milton Friedman, the 1976 Nobel Prize winner in
Economic Science and one of the founding members of the
University of Chicago School of Economics,69 advanced the
shareholder primacy view of the firm. 70 This theory maintains that the

firm has a narrow role. The firm exists to pursue profits and to secure
financial returns for the shareholders who own it.71 By contrast,
progressive corporate law theorists promote a view of the firm that
asks a company's management to consider the broader interests of
social constituencies when- making decisions, as opposed to the
narrow interests of shareholders.72

68. See Conlin, supra note 1, at 63 (describing the efforts of Hagedorn in managing
implementation of the Scotts wellness program in what he termed a "FEBA" or "forwardedge battle area" characterized by a large amount of legal uncertainty and the potential
for lawsuits); Conlin, supra note 46 ("[Scotts's legal team] told me we were going into
FEBA (forward edge of battle area). FEBA is not a cleanly defined area. On the ground
there's a lot of smoke, yelling and screaming and noise. FEBA is a kind of dangerous place
to be. For a public company, people don't want to be in FEBA. People want to play where
it's really safe." (quoting Scotts CEO Jim Hagedorn)). Hagedorn also noted the
uncertainty in finding adequate legal representation to defend an aggressive anti-tobacco
policy. "[T]rying to find a good litigator will be a challenge because the tobacco folks have
them conflicted out." Bridgeford, supra note 3, at 52. "You go to a good law firm, and they
basically say 'I can't take your business because I have tobacco money ......."Id.
69. Holcomb B. Noble, Milton Friedman, the Champion of Free Markets, is Dead at
94, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at Al.
70. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for ShareholderPrimacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190-92 (2002) (discussing Friedman's New York Times Magazine
article on shareholder primacy).
71. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits,N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970),.availableat http://scholar.google.com/scholar
url?hl=en&q=http://www.umich.edu/-thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf&sa=X&scisig=AAGBf
m2ow5EKPpLLiXQRcI6D8HywHfWNOg&oi=scholarr (describing the features of the
shareholder primacy model while criticizing the notion of corporate social responsibility);
see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (Univ. of Chi. Press 40th
anniversary ed. 2002) (arguing against corporate social responsibility, characterizing "the
acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much
money for their stockholders as possible" as "a fundamentally subversive doctrine").
72. See Stout, supra note 70, at 1190 (describing the so-called entity view of the firm
characteristic of progressive corporate law theorists).
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In addition to differing on the economic benefits of these two
theories,73 proponents of both models also differ as to the role of the
law in corporate governance.74 Corporate law scholars can debate the
merits of a legal rule that encourages firms to consider the interests of
those outside the firm, but even the most strident libertarian7 5 would

concede the right of corporations, or any group of individuals for that
matter, to pursue broader social goals free from the coercive power of
government.76 In this regard, some firms appear to be voluntarily

pursuing social goals that have no clear, discernible, or immediate
impact on the firm's balance sheet.77 One need only scan the pages of
a recent edition of The Wall Street Journalto see major corporations

proclaiming their support for an expansive social agenda, which

73. Advocates of corporate social responsibility have labored to demonstrate that
there is a compelling business case for such practices. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET
FOR VIRTUE 29 (Brookings Inst. Press 2005) (noting that "[a]n extensive body of
academic research [has] examine[d] the relationship between corporate responsibility and
profitability"). The business case for corporate social responsibility has not been
vindicated. See id. ("[The] central conclusion [of empirical analysis of corporate social
responsibility] can be easily summarized: at best, it is inconclusive."). But see id. at 45
(recognizing that the literature on corporate social responsibility indicates that the
doctrine "does make business sense for some firms in specific circumstances"); Aneel
Karnani, CSR Stuck in a Logical Trap, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 2011, at 105, 105
(arguing that firms will not engage in corporate social responsibility if it "is not profitable"
or "unless required to do so by law or regulation").
74. Supporters of progressive corporate law theory tend to advocate for state
legislatures to enact constituency statutes. These enabling statutes allow corporate
directors who traditionally owe fiduciary duties exclusively to shareholders to consider the
interests of other groups in performing their role as fiduciaries. See Brett H. McDonnell,
Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1227, 1230-32 (2004) (providing an overview of state corporate constituency statutes). To
date, North Carolina has not enacted a constituency statute.
75. For a debate among self-identified free-market libertarians regarding Friedman's
shareholder primacy model, see Milton Friedman, John Mackey & T.J. Rodgers,
Rethinking the Social Responsibility of Business, REASON, Oct. 2005, at 28,29.
76. This is not to deny the point made by Friedman that economic profit, in and of
itself, can be a useful social end. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 71, at 126 (criticizing the
"prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is wicked and immoral and must be curbed and
controlled by external forces").
77. Firms pursue these ends with support from a significant portion of the American
public. A 2011 survey found that fifty-six percent of Americans agree with the proposition
that "the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits." Milton FriedmanGoes
on Tour, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2011, at 63, 63. The same survey found support for the
shareholder primacy model to be strongest in the United Arab Emirates, India, and Japan.
Id. Germany, Italy, and Spain, by contrast, were the least receptive to shareholder
primacy. See id. (noting that less than forty percent of those surveyed in each of those
countries agreed with Friedman's position).
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includes promoting public health, renewable energy, and community
development.7 8

These efforts aimed at promoting corporate social responsibility
provide an additional lens through which to view firm health and
wellness programs in general and anti-tobacco policies in particular.
Regardless of the firm's ability to fully justify a health and wellness
program on financial grounds,79 any financial upside does not

eliminate a purely altruistic motivation. For example, firms may
create such programs out of genuine concern for employee welfare or
a desire to engage in a broader social mission of corporate social
responsibility. 80
The Smoker's Protection Act conflicts with both the shareholder
primacy model and the progressive corporate view of the role of the
firm. From the standpoint of the shareholder primacy model, the Act
limits management's ability to pursue shareholder value through
programs that have the potential to limit the costs incurred as a result
of employee tobacco use. At the same time, the Act limits the
freedom of North Carolina firms to pursue alternative theories of
corporate governance that promote goals other than securing
financial returns for shareholders. 8'

78. See, e.g., Chevron Corp., Oil Companies Should Put Their Profits to Good UseWe Agree, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2010, at A7. Chevron's global "We Agree" advertising
campaign, while proclaiming Chevron's support for the global fight against AIDS, also
pledges that the multi-national energy corporation will support small businesses and
community development. See Chevron Corp., Chevron Launches New Global Advertising
Campaign:"We Agree", CHEVRON.COM (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.chevron.com/chevron
/pressreleases/artice/1182010-chevronlaunchesnewglobaladvertisingcampaignweagree.n
ews (announcing the launch of Chevron's advertising campaign); see also Ben Gasselman,
Chevron Ad Campaign Answers Critics Head-On, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2010, at B10
(discussing Chevron's campaign in response to critics of the oil industry following BP's oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010).
79. As discussed earlier in this Comment, there are reasons to doubt, for certain types
of employers, that a rigorous health and wellness program would generate adequate
financial returns. See supra note 62 (providing a brief financial model of the benefits of an
anti-tobacco policy).
80. In describing Scotts's health and wellness program, Hagedorn hinted at
motivations that go beyond the bottom line of returning shareholder value: "I always hope
people feel we care about them and we're a family. What's wrong with saying we care
about our people?" Conlin, supra note 46. According to one estimate, over 12,000 North
Carolinians die every year due to cigarette smoking. Tobacco-Free Kids Campaign, The
Toll of Tobacco in North Carolina,TOBACCOFREEKIDS.ORG, http://www.tobaccofreekids
.org/facts-issues/tollus/northcarolina (last updated Nov. 28, 2011).
81. In this sense, the goal would be improving the overall health of employees.
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II. THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF THE SMOKER'S PROTECTION
ACT

This Part examines the events leading to the passage of the
Smoker's Protection Act. It describes these events against the
historical backdrop of the early 1990s, a period which saw North
Carolina firms begin to fashion policies to restrict employee tobacco
use. This Part also draws upon previously uncanvassed material,
including legislative committee testimony and contemporaneous
newspaper accounts, in an attempt to ascertain the General
Assembly's intent in enacting the Smoker's Protection Act.
A.

The Movement Against Lifestyle Discrimination
At the time the Smoker's Protection Act was passed in 1992,
public sentiment in the United States increasingly disfavored
employment discrimination based on lifestyle choices.' In North
Carolina, this opposition to lifestyle discrimination was fueled in no
small part by the actions of some private employers. In 1989, the
North Carolina firm Litho Industries Carolina ("Litho") took a hard
line against tobacco use. Similar to Scotts, the Raleigh-based printing
company announced that it would stop hiring cigarette smokers.8 3
Also like Scotts, Litho justified the decision on the basis of health
care costs and the lost productivity attributable to smoking."s At the
same time, in a much less aggressive move, pharmaceutical
manufacturer Glaxo, a predecessor to GlaxoSmithKline, forbade
employees from smoking on company property during work hours.85
As these North Carolina employers implemented discriminatory
policies against tobacco users, the North Carolina General Assembly
82. Reflecting this general public sentiment, state legislatures enacted laws forbidding
employers from discriminating in employment decisions based on an employee's lawful
activities or use of lawful products. See Lisa L. Frye, Note, "You've Come a Long Way,
Smokers": North Carolina Preservesthe Employee's Right to Smoke Off the Job in General
Statutes Section 95-28.2, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1963, 1979 (1993) ("At least four states had, by
1989, enacted statutes protecting smokers' rights in some manner.").
83. See John Cleghorn, Philip Morris Huffs, Puffs Over Firms' Smoking Stance,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 9, 1989, at 2C (" 'We saw some long-term smokers who
were valued employees suffer. One lost a lung,' says [Litho Vice President Stanley]
Morris. 'Some companies silently discriminate against smokers. We went out in the
open.' "). The policy drew the ire of cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris, which maligned
Litho for its alleged "abuse of power." Id.
84. See id. ("[Litho] stand[s] firmly behind ... [its] rules ....
[Litho] say[s], the
policies are cutting costs and should boost productivity.").
85. Glaxo's no-smoking policy also offended Philip Morris's sensibilities. Id. As with
Litho, Philip Morris condemned the pharmaceutical manufacturer for abusing its power
over employees. Id.
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began to look at anti-discrimination employment laws more
generally. For example, following the enactment of the federal Civil
Rights Act of 1991,86 North Carolina legislators considered whether
the federal legislation went far enough in protecting workers from
racial discrimination.87 The Legislative Research Study Committee on
Discrimination in Employment listened to testimony from workers,
law professors, public interest groups, and industry lobbyists. 8 It also
heard testimony on lifestyle discrimination issues in employment.

86. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 16, & 42 U.S.C. (2006)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a
response to a series of Supreme Court decisions from the late 1980s which were thought to
limit the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164, 178 (1989) (holding that a black employee's claim of racial harassment was not
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 769 (1989) (holding that
white firefighters who had not intervened in a case where a consent decree was entered
could challenge employment decisions made under those decrees); Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989) (holding that statistical evidence showing a higher
proportion of nonwhite workers in cannery positions as opposed to non-cannery positions
was insufficient to make a prima facie case under the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (requiring defendants in employment
discrimination cases to prove sex was not a motivating factor in decision by preponderance
of the evidence as opposed to clear and convincing evidence). The Act overturned the
result in Pattersonby making racial harassment actionable under federal law. Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006). It also altered the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases. § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
87. To this end, the Legislative Research Commission Study Committee on
Discrimination in Employment held a series of hearings over a year long period from 1991
to 1992 in order to investigate employment discrimination in North Carolina. The sixteenmember committee held nine separate hearings. See STUDY COMM. ON DISCRIMINATION
IN EMP'T, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, ATTENDANCE, 1991-1992 GEN. ASSEMB.,
1991-1992 SESS. (N.C. 1992) (providing attendance record for committee hearings held on
December 16, 1991, January 21, 1992, February 25, 1992, March 31, 1992, April 22, 1992,
October 7, 1992, November 4, 1992, November 23, 1992, and December 18, 1992). In his
testimony, Wake Forest University School of Law Professor J.W. Parker argued that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not go far enough in scaling back the Supreme Court's
decisions. See STUDY COMM. ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMP'T, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMM'N, MINUTES OF JAN. 21, 1992 MEETING, 1991-1992 GEN. ASSEMB., 1991-1992
SESS., at 4 (N.C. 1992) ("In conclusion, Professor Parker stated what the Committee needs
to consider when drafting a statute is to look at Title VII and the entire range of civil
rights legislation and adopt statutes to be interpreted by our State courts as remedial
legislation which advances the civil rights of our citizens and not in a way that is hostile to
them."); see also F. Alan Boyce, NC. is Urged to be the Guardian of Civil Rights,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 22, 1992, at 3C (summarizing Professor Parker's testimony
before the committee).
88. See, e.g., STUDY COMM. ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMP'T, LEGISLATIVE
RESEARCH COMM'N, MINUTES OF JAN. 21, 1992 MEETING, 1991-1992 GEN. ASSEMB.,
1991-1992 SESS., at 4 (N.C. 1992); STUDY COMM. ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMP'T,
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMM'N, MINUTES OF FEB. 25, 1992 MEETING, 1991-1992
GEN. ASSEMB., 1991-1992 SESS., at 4 (N.C. 1992).
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Strange Bedfellows: The ACLU and Others Join Forces with the
Tobacco Industry to Promote the Smoker's ProtectionAct

It is rare for the goals of the ACLU and the tobacco industry to
align.89 Yet in the case of the Smoker's Protection Act, their interests
aligned. Indeed, a strategic alliance between the ACLU and the

tobacco industry was instrumental in helping to convince the North
Carolina General Assembly to pass the Act.90
In 1991, the ACLU and cigarette manufacturer R.J. Reynolds
discussed a partnership to finance a study on employment
discrimination against smokers. 91 Though the results of that study

were apparently not made available to the public, the ACLU sent an
expert to testify to the Legislative Research Commission Study on
Discrimination in Employment on the need for North Carolina to
enact lifestyle discrimination legislation. Lewis Maltby, at that time
the director of the ACLU's task force on lifestyle discrimination in
employment, testified before this committee. Maltby started his
testimony by providing a brief historical overview of lifestyle
89. The interests of the tobacco industry in the fight for the Smoker's Protection Act
are fairly easy to understand. If a significant number of private employers either refused to
hire cigarette smokers or fired them, there would be less demand for cigarettes. The
ACLU's motivations appeared to stem from a desire to protect worker privacy rights from
encroachment by private employers. See Lifestyle Discriminationin the Workplace: Your
Right to Privacy Under Attack, ACLU.ORG (Mar. 12, 2002), http://www.aclu.org/racialjustice-womens-rights/lifestyle-discrimination-workplace-your-right-privacy-under-attack
(making a case against employer lifestyle discrimination). Judge Robert H. Bork, who
served on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and was
President Ronald Reagan's nominee to the Supreme Court in 1987, Robert H. Bork,
HUDSON INST., http://www.hudson.org/learn/index.cfm?fuseaction=stafft-bio&eid
=BorkRob (last visited Dec. 29, 2011), has commented on the organization's selective
commitment to individual rights: "[T]he ACLU argues on the one hand for rights to
abortion, to practice prostitution, to homosexual marriage, to produce and consume
pornography, and much more." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:

MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 97 (rev. ed. 2003). Yet, at the same
time, "the ACLU is ... for more government limitations on the freedoms of business
owners and managers, such as the power to discharge an employee for unsatisfactory
performance." Id. at 98.
90. Throughout 1992 at the North Carolina General Assembly, the ACLU and the
tobacco industry worked side-by-side to lobby legislators for the Smoker's Protection Act.
See Jack Betts, Smoking, Health and Civil Liberties Tobacco Lobby-This Time Siding
with the ACLU-Proves It's Still a Powerful Voice in N.C. General Assembly,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 15, 1992, at 15A (characterizing the relationship between
the ACLU and the tobacco industry as involving "the strangest of bedfellows" while
describing the collaborative efforts of the ACLU and cigarette manufacturers in securing
the passage of the Smoker's Protection Act).
91. See ACLU Asks RJR for Help, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Feb. 6, 1991, at B3;
Charles Babington, Health Groups Wary as ACLU asks RJR to Help Fund Project, NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 5, 1991, at B1.
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discrimination by focusing on the case of Henry Ford and the Ford
Motor Company.' He claimed that workers "were fired if they did
not live up to Henry Ford's standards" and decried Ford's "meddling
into the private lives of his employees."93 Maltby apparently did not
disclose to the committee that Henry Ford voluntarily
abandoned his
94
interference.
legislative
without
program
social
In addition to the ACLU, two North Carolina newspapers,
neither of which had a history of supporting the tobacco industry, 95
lent their powerful voices to the cause of the Smoker's Protection
Act. The Raleigh News and Observer lauded the legislation as a

necessary step to prevent North Carolina firms from creating a
"jungle of discriminatory treatment."96 Similarly, the Greensboro
News and Record editorialized in favor of the legislation, maintaining
that employees should not have to "change [their] personal habits in
order to keep [a] job."9 7 The article added "[e]mployers must not be
able to indiscriminately dictate what employees do away from
work.

98

92. See

STUDY COMM. ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMP'T, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH

COMM'N, MINUTES OF FEB. 25,
SESS., at 4 (N.C. 1992).

1992

MEETING, 1991-1992 GEN. ASSEMB.,

1991-1992

93. Id. While Ford's program certainly had paternalistic qualities, it is far from clear
that workers were terminated in a callous, arbitrary manner for their failure to live up to
unrealistic standards. See generally STEVEN WATTS, THE PEOPLE'S TYCOON: HENRY
FORD AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 199-224 (2005) (describing Ford Motor Company's
sociological program). Ford workers were apparently "mixed" in their support of Ford's
sociological department, but far from unanimous in opposition. Id. at 220-21.
94. By the end of 1921, Ford had abandoned his sociological program. WATrS, supra
note 93, at 223-24. It is thought that resistance from management was the program's
undoing. Id. at 224.
95. In the early 1990s, both Raleigh's News and Observer and Greensboro's News and
Record called for increasing taxes on cigarette sales. See Editorial, Gilding the Golden
Leaf, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 22, 1991, at A12 ("The R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. is sparing no expense in its efforts to deny North Carolinians the millions of
dollars that could be reaped from a reasonable increase in this state's disgracefully low
cigarette tax."); Editorial, Raise Cigarette Tax, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Mar. 5, 1990,
at A10; Editorial, Taxing Tobacco-Public Says Yes, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., May
12, 1990, at A20. The News and Record also editorialized against a 1991 proposal in the
General Assembly that would have preempted local anti-smoking ordinances. Editorial,
Keep Smoking Rules Local, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., June 25, 1991, at A12.
96. Editorial, On Your Time-Not the Boss's, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
June 24, 1992, at A12 (arguing that the law was necessary to prevent employers from
engaging in such discrimination and maintaining that allowing such discrimination would
be "the start of a slippery slope").
97. Editorial, Work Rules Shouldn't Infringe on Employee Time, GREENSBORO NEWS
& REC., May 28, 1992, at A16.
98. Id.
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C. The Legislative History of the Smoker's ProtectionAct99
The Smoker's Protection Act, as originally proposed, sought to
protect workers from employment discrimination based on engaging
in any "lawful activity."'" After the bill emerged from the Senate
Judiciary Committee, it was stripped of the "lawful activity" language
during Senate debate and instead amended to bar discrimination on
the basis of "lawful use of lawful products or political activity."'' The
bill passed the North Carolina Senate in this form.'0 2 Protection for
"political activity" was dropped from the bill after it came out of
committee in the North Carolina House of Representatives. 3 At that
point, the bill only protected an employee's "lawful use of lawful
products" while off duty." The bill, as eventually passed by the
North Carolina House, retained the same language approved by the
House committee.'05 After the bill emerged from a joint SenateHouse conference committee, it contained the same "lawful use of
lawful products" language."° Thus attempts to draw the Smoker's
Protection Act to protect a broader class of activity failed as this more
narrow language ultimately became law."0 7
III. CIGARETTE SMOKING AS A CIVIL RIGHT: THE LAW OF THE
SMOKER'S PROTECTION ACT

This Part considers the Smoker's Protection Act with respect to
how the statute modifies North Carolina employment law, as well as
how it interacts with federal law. It also discusses the Act's
fundamental objectives exception, a provision that exempts some
organizations from the strictures of the statute.

99. An in-depth account of the legislative history of the Smoker's Protection Act has
been given elsewhere. See generally Frye, supra note 82, at 1980-81 (providing a broad
overview of the Act's legislative history and committee hearings, while emphasizing a
concern for employee privacy and the freedom to pursue legal activities outside of work
hours).
100. S.B. 1032, 1991-1992 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C., May 28, 1992).
101. S.B. 1032, 1991-1992 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C., June 24,1992).
102. S.B. 1032,1991-1992 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Engrossed, N.C., June 24, 1992).
103. S.B. 1032,1991-1992 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Draft, N.C., July 10, 1992).
104. Id.
105. S.B. 1032, 1991-1992 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Engrossed, N.C., July 15, 1992).
106. 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1023 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2011)).
107. Id.
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How the Smoker's ProtectionAct Modifies North Carolina'sAtWill Employment Regime

Employment arrangements in North Carolina are, by default,
"at-will."' 8 This means that in the absence of an employment
contract to the contrary, an employer has the right to fire an
employee at any time, for any reason.0 9 North Carolina law
recognizes three exceptions to this doctrine. First, the at-will
employment doctrine does not apply if there is an employment
contract in place. 10 Second, employers are not permitted to
discriminate on the basis of race, sex, or disability in employment
decisions."' Third, an employer may not terminate an employee if the
dismissal would violate public policy. The public policy implicated
must involve an "express ... declaration within the North Carolina

2
Constitution or General Statutes." 11
The Smoker's Protection Act falls under the third type of

exception to the at-will employment doctrine. The Act shields

cigarette smokers from North Carolina's traditional at-will
employment doctrine by placing smokers in a protected class and
making firings based on the "lawful use of lawful products" an illegal
employment practice."3
B.

The Mechanics of the Smoker's ProtectionAct

The Smoker's Protection Act is a type of lifestyle discrimination
statute.114 Depending on the jurisdiction, lifestyle discrimination
108. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has explained:
North Carolina is an employment-at-will state. This Court has repeatedly held that
in the absence of a contractual agreement between an employer and an employee
establishing a definite term of employment, the relationship is presumed to be
terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance
of either party.
Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997)
(citing Soles v. City of Raleigh Civil Serv. Comm'n, 345 N.C. 443,446, 480 S.E.2d 685,687
(1997); Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987)).
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Considine v. Compass Group, USA, Inc., 145 N.C. App. 314, 319, 551 S.E.2d 179,
182, affd, 354 N.C. 568, 557 S.E.2d 528 (2001).
113. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2 (2011).
114. Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have some form of a lifestyle
discrimination statute. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 96(k), 98.6 (West 2011); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40s (West 2011); D.C. CODE
§ 7-1703.3 (2008); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-54-1 to -4 (LexisNexis 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Supp. 2011); LA. REV. STAT.
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statutes vary in the level of protection they offer workers. Some
protect employees from discrimination based on any lawful activity,"'
others protect use of lawful products,11 6 while still others explicitly
17
protect use of tobacco products.
The Smoker's Protection Act is a "lawful products" statute. It

prevents an employer1 18 from discriminating in employment decisions
as to the terms and conditions of employment "because the
prospective employee or the employee engages in or has engaged in

ANN. § 23:966 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 597 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 181.938 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33 (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 290.145 (Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-313 to -314 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 613.333 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a (LexisNexis 2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-1 to -4 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-11-1 to -6 (West
2003); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 500-03 (West 1999); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 659A.315, 659A.885 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-14 (2008); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-85 (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-1-304(e) (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2902 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-319 (LexisNexis 2008); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.325, 111.35 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 27-9-105(a) (2011).
115. Four jurisdictions have enacted lawful activity statutes. See CAL. LAB. CODE

§§ 96(k), 98.6; COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5; N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.4-01.
116. Eight states protect employees against discrimination based on the use of lawful
products. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938; Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 290.145; MONT. CODE ANN.

§§ 39-2-313

to -314; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 613.333; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2; TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 111.325, 111.35.

117. Eighteen jurisdictions explicitly protect the use of tobacco products. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40s; D.C. CODE § 7-1703.03; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-5-4-1 to -4; KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.040; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:966; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 597; Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-7-33; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37-a; N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 34:6B-1 to -4; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-11-1 to -6; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 500-03;
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.315, 659A.885; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.10-14; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 41-1-85; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-11; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2902; W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 21-3-19; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a).
118. The reach of the Smoker's Protection Act is very broad in that an "employer"
under the statute includes the State of North Carolina, all of its political subdivisions, and
all "private employers with three or more regularly employed employees." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-28.2(a).
From Murphy to Manteo, North Carolinians boast of their cultural and
geographical

diversity. By making the Act applicable to all the

subdivisions,
governments:
the particular
decentralized,

the General Assembly sent this message to North Carolina's local
Raleigh knows best. The Smoker's Protection Act casts aside concerns for
needs of local communities by substituting a one-size-fits-all solution for
local self-government.

state's political
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the lawful use of lawful products if the activity occurs off the premises
of the employer during nonworking hours."' 9
The Act makes an exception for smoking that adversely impacts
job performance 0 and for organizations that have anti-smoking
activism as a "fundamental objective" of the organization. 12 1 The
statute also provides that employers may discriminate in offering
policies to employees based on
differential rates for health insurance
22
1
products.
lawful
of
use
their
Previous commentary on the Smoker's Protection Act suggested
that, because of the uncertain application of these exceptions, "the
courts will play a critical role in determining the scope" of the
Smoker's Protection Act. 2 1 Yet, to date, there are no North Carolina
cases interpreting the Act. 124
C.

The Smoker's ProtectionAct and Federal Law

The Smoker's Protection Act supplements federal law. The
statute does nothing to modify the rights workers enjoy under federal
anti-discrimination laws. 25 However, firms seeking to pass along the
costs of tobacco use to employees who smoke under the health
insurance discrimination exception of the Act 126 run the risk of
violating federal law. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") limits the amount of costs an
119. § 95-28.2(b). Remedies for successful plaintiffs under the statute include lost
wages, reinstatement of benefits and employment, and attorney's fees. § 95-28.2(e). The
statute of limitations for claims under section 95-28.2 is one year. Id.
120. § 95-28.2(b).
121. § 95-28.2(c)(2). For additional discussion of the fundamental objectives exception,
see infra Part III.D.
122. § 95-28.2(d). However, as shown in Part III.C infra, since federal law places limits
on the costs an employer may pass along to employees, the provision is of limited practical
use to North Carolina firms.
123. Frye, supra note 82, at 1987.
124. Looking to other jurisdictions, there is one South Dakota case that provides an
on-point interpretation of a similar statute. In Wood v. S.D. Cement Plant, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota held that its state's tobacco products statute was not violated by an
employer restricting the off-duty smoking of a kiln plant operator. 1999 SD 8, T 17, 588
N.W.2d 227, 231.
125. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C. (2006)) (prohibiting racial, ethnic, and religious
discrimination with regard to voting rights and places of public accommodation); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006) (forbidding
discrimination on the basis of age); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)
(clarifying the discrimination .protections given by the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-213 (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of physical or mental ability).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2(d).
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employer can pass along to an employee based on an individual's
health status. 27 Regulations promulgated under HIPAA set a limit at
twenty percent of total health insurance premiums. 128 The new federal
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA") changed the
law to allow employers to pass thirty percent of the costs on to
employees. 129 The PPACA gives discretion to the United States
Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of
the Treasury to raise the limit to a maximum of fifty percent. 30
Even with the increased leeway given to firms under the
PPACA, the insurance discrimination exception in the Smoker's
Protection Act is practically ineffectual. As discussed above, a
conservative estimate of the average annual costs associated with
employing a smoker are $4,570.64 more than employing a nonsmoker.' The average annual employee premium contribution in
2010 was $3,997.132 Even allowing for a fifty percent increase in
premium contribution, an employer would run a cost deficit of
$2,572.14 in employing a smoker instead of a non-smoker.'3 3

127. HIPAA forbids employers from excluding employees and their dependents from

coverage based on health status and a number of other factors. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)(A)-(H) (2006).
HIPAA also forbids employees and their dependents from "pay[ing] a premium or
contribution which is greater than such premium or contribution for a similarly situated
individual enrolled in the plan." § 1182(b)(1). However, this prohibition does not prevent
employers "from establishing premium discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise
applicable copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health
promotion and disease prevention." § 1182(b)(2)(B).
128. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(2)(i) (2011); see also Lucinda Jesson, Weighing the
Wellness Programs, 15 VA. J.SOC. POL'Y & L. 217, 245-47 (2008) (discussing HIPAA's
prohibition of discrimination based on health factors).
129. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat.
119, 157-58 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(j) (Supp. 2011)) ("The reward for
the wellness program, together with the reward for other wellness programs with respect
to the plan that requires satisfaction of a standard related to a health status factor, shall
not exceed 30 percent of the cost of employee-only coverage under the plan.").
130. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (Supp. 2011) ("The Secretaries of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and the Treasury may increase the reward available under
this subparagraph to up to 50 percent of the cost of coverage if the Secretaries determine
that such an increase is appropriate."). This provision of the PPACA appears to be a
direct response to certain industry leaders who asked for the limit to be increased as a part
of health care reform legislation. See, e.g., Steven A. Burd, How Safeway is Cutting HealthCare Costs, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009, at A15.

131. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
132. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 38, at 1.
133. This figure is arrived at by finding the maximum allowable premium contribution
increase above $3,997 (this is equal to fifty percent of $3,997, or $1,998.50) and then
subtracting this amount from the estimated annual costs of employing a smoker
($4,570.64).

538
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D. A PossibleException to the Exception: Does the Fundamental
Objectives Exception Provide Firms an Escape?

Perhaps the most ambiguous part of the Smoker's Protection Act
is the so-called fundamental objectives exception. This exception
provides that it is permissible, notwithstanding the language of the
statute, for employers to "[r]estrict the lawful use of lawful products
by employees during nonworking hours if the restriction relates to the
' No North Carolina
fundamental objectives of the organization."134
court has construed this language. From a linguistic standpoint, it
seems clear that based on the phrase "by employees," the statute

covers existing employees as opposed to prospective employees. In
other words, a firm could not use the fundamental objectives
exception to institute a "no smokers need apply" policy. A firm could,

however, limit the off-duty smoking of persons already employed to
the extent such a restriction "relates to the fundamental objectives of
'
the organization."135

It is unclear what organizations are covered by the fundamental
objections exception. Almost certainly a nonprofit, educational
organization that opposes the use of tobacco would qualify under the
terms of the Act,136 but what about hospitals, physician practices, and
nursing homes?137 Does the exception extend to a health club? What
about a pharmaceutical and medical products company? In an ironic
twist, could a cigarette manufacturer invoke the exception to forbid
its employees from smoking another manufacturer's brand of
cigarettes?138
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.2(c)(2) (2011).
135. Id.
136. See Frye, supra note 82, at 1986 ("The fundamental-objectives exemption
certainly should apply to employers like the American Cancer Society or the American
Heart Association, organizations that discourage smoking because their primary objective
is to promote good health.").
137. See id. at 1986-87 ("The harder question is whether the exemption would apply to
organizations whose primary objectives include promoting good health generally.").
138. A similar type of situation has arisen in at least two beer company firings. Ross
Hopkins, formerly employed by American Eagle Distributing Company, an AnheuserBusch wholesaler, was fired after he was caught drinking Coors beer off duty. Monte
Whaley, Firing Brings Issue to a Head: Off-Clock Beer Led to Dismissal,DENVER POST,
May 18, 2005, at C1. Hopkins filed suit against his former employer but dropped the case
just before it was about to go to trial in Colorado state court. Monte Whaley, Man Drops
His Case of Bud, DENVER POST, Oct. 27, 2005, at B2. In a similar situation, a Wisconsin
employee at a Miller Brewing Company distributor was fired for being photographed
drinking a Bud Light. Miller Distributor Worker Says Bud Choice Cost Job, CAPITAL
TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Feb. 12, 2005, at D10, availableat 2005 WLNR 2043148. There is
no evidence that the employee filed suit under Wisconsin's lawful products statute. WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 111.35 (West 2002). This is probably because Wisconsin law provides an
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The text of the Smoker's Protection Act does not provide a
simple answer to any of these questions. If a bold, enterprising North
Carolina firm were to challenge the Smoker's Protection Act under
the fundamental objectives exception, it would have to demonstrate
that limits on tobacco use relate to the firm's objectives. Since the
plain text of the exception is ambiguous, North Carolina courts would
apply the rules of statutory construction as set out by the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. In interpreting ambiguous statutes, North
Carolina courts have been instructed to construe the statute in order
to "ascertain the legislative will." 139 Legislative intent is determined
by looking at the legislative history of a statute as well as the
circumstances surrounding its enactment.14 °
The legislative history of the Smoker's Protection Act favors a
broad reading of the exception. The fundamental objectives
exception did not appear in the bill that eventually became the
Smoker's Protection Act until the language was introduced in the
conference report adopted by both the North Carolina House and
Senate."' After the bill was adopted by the Senate and moved to the
House, Representative Coy Privette proposed an amendment that
would have explicitly exempted certain nonprofit organizations from
the Act,1 42 but it failed by a fifty-three to fifty-two vote in the
House.4 The bill moved to the House-Senate conference committee
with no exception provision, but emerged with the ambiguous, much
broader fundamental objectives exception that is now part of the
Smoker's Protection Act."4

exception when the use of the lawful product "[c]reates a conflict of interest, or the
appearance of a conflict of interest, with the job-related responsibilities of that individual's
employment, membership or licensure." § 111.35(2)(b). Drinking a competitor's beer
would arguably be a conflict of interest under the Wisconsin statute.
139. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137
(1990) (citing Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797 (1948)).
140. See id. ("This intent 'must be found from the language of the act, its legislative
history and the circumstances surrounding its adoption which throw light upon the evil
sought to be remedied.'" (quoting North Carolina Milk Comm'n v. Food Stores, 270 N.C.
323, 332, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967))).
141. CONF. REP., S.B. 1032, 1991-1992 GEN. ASSEMB., 1991-1992 SESS., at 1-2 (N.C.

July 23, 1992).
142. Representative Privette's amendment provided that the Smoker's Protection Act
would "not apply to nonprofit organizations, including, but not limited to, churches,
synagogues, church-sponsored schools, church-sponsored day care centers, and private
schools." S.B. 1032, 1991-1992 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (H.R. Amend. No. 5, N.C. July
15, 1992).
143. Id.
144. The exception contained in the floor amendment was actually narrower than the
one that eventually became law. See id. That fact is at least somewhat counter-intuitive
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In addition to the surrounding circumstances supporting a broad
construction of the fundamental objectives exception, 145 a North
Carolina court would be justified in construing the exception broadly,
declining to reward poor legislative drafting, especially against the
146
backdrop of the common law presumption of at-will employment.
To hold otherwise, it seems, would allow advocates of a narrow
exemption to achieve through judicial interpretation what they failed
to accomplish through the legislative process.
A firm interested in challenging the Smoker's Protection Act
could consider amending its articles of incorporation or bylaws to
explicitly include limiting tobacco use as a fundamental objective of
the firm. If the policy were challenged under the Smoker's Protection
Act, the firm could bring those documents to the attention of the
court. It could then point to the text of the statute and claim that since
limiting the tobacco use of its employees is now, along with
conducting its regular business, one of its fundamental objectives, the
Smoker's Protection Act should not apply. Since the Act has not been
tested in any North Carolina court, it remains to be seen whether this
argument would ultimately be effective. It is, at the very least, a
tenable position for a firm to take in light of the text and legislative
history of the Smoker's Protection Act.
IV. THE CASE FOR REPEALING THE SMOKER'S PROTECTION ACT
This Part outlines several reasons for repealing North Carolina's
Smoker's Protection Act and for restoring to employers the freedom
to discriminate in employment decisions based on a person's tobacco
use. It first suggests that the Smoker's Protection Act actually
subverts the values it allegedly advances, namely that the Act
considering that of the twelve members of the House on the conference committee, nine
voted against Privette's amendment, two voted for it, and one abstained. See CONF. REP.,
S.B. 1032, at 3 (providing a list of conferees from the North Carolina House). North
Carolina's fundamental objectives exception is much broader than those in other states
with similar anti-discrimination laws. For example, others typically apply either to antismoking nonprofit organizations. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5 (West 2008);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313 (2011), or health care organizations, see MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 290.145 (Supp. 2011).
145. For a discussion of the historical context surrounding the enactment of the
Smoker's Protection Act, see supra Part II.A. This account tends to support the view that
the legislature wanted to prohibit discrimination against tobacco users.
146. This presumption of at-will employment was critical in another case in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina construed an employment discrimination statute. In
Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., the court held that HIV-positive persons were not
protected by North Carolina's Handicapped Persons Protection Act. 326 N.C. 205, 218,
388 S.E.2d 134, 142 (1990).
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advances individual liberty over nannyism and paternalism. It then
describes how the Act infringes on the freedom of North Carolina
businesses to explore corporate social responsibility. Finally, it
examines the Act in the context of the free market for labor and
criticizes the contradictory public policy message the Smoker's
Protection Act sends to North Carolinians.
A.

The Smoker's ProtectionAct as a PyrrhicVictory

Supporters of the Smoker's Protection Act hailed it as an
advance for individual liberty and a triumph over employer nannyism,
paternalism, and control. 4 7 In reality, contrary to the claims of these
147. After the bill passed the North Carolina Senate, Senator Alexander P. Sands, III
noted that "[w]hat this bill is about is freedom." Jim Morrill, Bill Bars Bosses from
Controlling Workers' Off-Hour Habits, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 24, 1992, at 1A.
Senator Sands elaborated on this point, invoking the memory of America's war dead:
"This is the reason so many men and women have died in this country, for freedom." Id.
Senator Helen Marvin also struck the chord of individual freedom: "Freedom of certain
rights of individuals is more important than the state trying to enforce a provision that
would help companies reduce their insurance costs." Id.
Based on contemporaneous newspaper reports, one could be forgiven for
questioning whether the Act's sole intent was to cause liberty to reign as a high-minded
posthumous tribute to the sacrifice of America's troops. The Raleigh News and Observer
reported that, about a week before the North Carolina Senate voted on the Smoker's
Protection Act, Senator Kenneth Royall was treated to a retirement celebration that
"wasn't just another party." Van Denton, Financing of Galas Criticized, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), July 3, 1992, at Al. According to the News and Observer
report, sponsors of the Royall tribute "shelled out $31,000-more than enough to pay for
the $6,300 golf tournament at Treyburn Country Club and for the $10,400 dinner at the
Sheraton Imperial." Id. At the dinner, the News and Observer reported that 360 people,
"including most of the state Senate," feasted on prime rib as they honored Royall. Id.
Tobacco interests reportedly contributed "more than $5,000" for the event and tobacco
lobbyist Lawrence A. Bewley, "a former corporate lobbyist for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.," organized the extravaganza. Id. A little more than a week after the event, the North
Carolina Senate voted to enact the Smoker's Protection Act. Id. "That had absolutely
nothing to do, even remotely, with the Royall tribute," Bewley reportedly told the News
and Observer. Id. " 'No one was out there discussing a specific piece of legislation,' Bewley
said. 'Everyone was there to simply honor Kenneth for his 26 years of working for the
people of North Carolina.'" Id. The News and Observer reported that North Carolina
Secretary of State Rufus Edmisten, the official responsible for enforcing state lobbying
laws at the time, agreed with Bewley that the event was not lobbying. Id. "I think it would
be callous for us to require them to report that." Id.
It appears the retirement party was not the first time Senator Royall received
benefits from the tobacco industry. A year earlier, as the General Assembly considered
tobacco taxes, The Charlotte Observer reported that Royall "played golf as a guest of
Philip Morris U.S.A. tobacco company" in Pinehurst. Legislators Treated to Golf Outing,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 25, 1991, at lB. To his critics, The Charlotte Observer
reported that Senator Royall said, "I've been there [in the General Assembly] for 25
years, and nobody's even questioned anything I've done about that type of thing." Id. The
Charlotte Observer also reported that Senator Sands, one of the primary advocates of the
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proponents, the Smoker's Protection Act actually undermines these
values.

1. Individual Liberty
One of the key objectives of the smokers' rights movement is
that it seeks to defend an individual's right to smoke cigarettes free
from government intervention. 1" As far as this movement bases its

Smoker's Protection Act in the North Carolina Senate, played golf at the same event as "a
guest of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co." Id.
148. The smokers' rights movement is decentralized. It consists of a number of
different organizations that lobby against smoking bans. Much of its rhetoric sounds in
property rights and individual freedom against government power. See, e.g., The Property
Rights Newsletter, SMOKERS CLUB, http://www.smokersclubinc.com/ (last visited Dec. 29,
2011). The distinction between private and government power is crucial to matters of
constitutional law. Some of the literature on smoker's protection statutes appears to
contain the idea that there could be a cognizable constitutional claim against a private
employer for discrimination on the basis of cigarette smoking. See Frye, supra note 82, at
1972 (arguing that the constitutional law of a smoking ban enforced by a private employer
"defies prediction"). These claims center on unenumerated privacy rights the Supreme
Court has created out of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003)
(finding that the right to engage in intimate, consensual, sexual conduct-including samesex relations-is a protected liberty interest); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 834-36 (1992) (affirming the right to an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (holding that there is a right to marital privacy). Drawing on these
cases, one might argue that the right to smoke cigarettes can be found in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if there was such a right, it would be
unenforceable against private employers. The Supreme Court has held time and again that
the rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not implicated by private conduct. See Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("As a matter of substantive
constitutional law the state-action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the fact that
'most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by
governments.'" (quoting Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978))); see also
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (noting that under The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause does not apply to
private conduct). For the Constitution to apply, then, there must be public conduct or
government agency. Absent government action, smokers do not have a constitutional right
to smoke that is enforceable against private actors or firms. Smokers may pursue statutory
protections by lobbying Congress or their state legislature, but their rights against other
private parties are not anchored in the Constitution.
State action triggers the Constitution. Thus if the City of Chicago were to entirely
forbid city workers from smoking cigarettes, a city employee could bring a cognizable
claim under both the United States and Illinois state constitutions. In Grusendorfv. City of
Oklahoma City, the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit sustained such a policy against
constitutional challenge. See 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987). Grusendorfinvolved an
employment agreement between a firefighter trainee and a city fire department. Id. at 540.
In the agreement, the trainee promised "he would not smoke a cigarette, either on or off
duty, for a period of one year from the time he began work." Id. Applying rational basis
scrutiny, the Tenth Circuit upheld the agreement. Id. at 543. Similarly, in City of North
Miami v. Kurtz, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a local government's restrictions on
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arguments in property rights and, by extension, an individual's right
to use his property, it has sound points. A commitment to respect for
private property would imply that individuals have a right to smoke
cigarettes without interference from government. Similarly, a
commitment to property rights should protect the right of owners of
bars and other local establishments to permit smoking on the
premises of their enterprises.149
What the Smoker's Protection Act represents is a significant
deviation from this argument for smokers' rights. The Act forces
employers who either object to smoking or wish not to pay for it into
subsidizing the habits of tobacco addicts under force of law.150 Far
from a victory for liberty, the Smoker's Protection Act is in reality a
triumph for government coercion and an attack on freedom of
contract in North Carolina. As Professor Richard Epstein has
explained, such an effort to undermine freedom of contract is also an
affront to individual freedom.
Freedom of contract is an aspect of individual liberty, every bit
as much as freedom of speech, or freedom in the selection of
marriage partners or in the adoption of religious beliefs or
affiliations .... The desire to make one's own choices about

employment may be as strong as it is with respect to marriage
or participation in religious activities, and it is doubtless more
pervasive than the desire to participate in political activity.151
Instead of employment arrangements reflecting the freedom of choice
in the marketplace, this statute takes some terms off the table. It
substitutes the wisdom of the market with central state planning by
the North Carolina General Assembly.
2. Nannyism and Paternalism
Objections to private firms limiting off-duty smoking are
typically anchored in an abhorrence of the paternalistic nature of the
arrangement. 52 The Smoker's Protection Act supposedly eliminates
employing smokers against federal and state constitutional challenges. 653 So.2d 1025,
1029 (Fla. 1995).
149. North Carolina enacted a smoking ban in 2009. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-491 to 500 (2011). The ban limits the right of bar and restaurant owners to control their property
and therefore undermines private property rights and individual liberty. See § 130A-496.
150. In some sense the Smoker's Protection Act is analogous to a law requiring a bar or
restaurant to allow patrons to smoke on its premises.
151. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,953
(1984).
152. See supra note 66 (collecting negative responses from consumers and media
commentators about employers controlling their workers).
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this paternalism in favor of an individual's freedom to smoke
cigarettes. This objection to what Professor Henderson calls the
"nanny corporation" misunderstands what this statute actually
accomplishes. 153 Far from an exercise in liberating helpless individuals
from the excessive paternalism of firms, the Smoker's Protection Act
is in reality an exercise in nanny statism. The Act interposes the might
of government between employer and employee. It operates on the
basic assumption that employees are not capable of bargaining with
an employer for off-duty smoking rights and thus promotes the notion
that "people who are competent enough to marry, vote, and pray are
... unable to protect themselves in their day-to-day business
transactions.' 15 4 In that sense, the statute infantilizes employees and
job applicants as it deprives North Carolinians who might actually
153. See generally Henderson, supra note 49 (describing the characteristics of a nanny
corporation).
154. Epstein, supra note 151, at 954. At one time, such employment decisions were
held by the Supreme Court to be shielded from government power by the Constitution.
Indeed, in Adair v. United States, the Court boldly stated:
[I]t is not within the functions of government-at least in the absence of contract
between the parties-to compel any person in the course of his business and
against his will to accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel
any person, against his will, to perform personal services for another.
208 U.S. 161, 174 (1908); see also DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT:
REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 87-88 (2011) (discussing Adair and
the quoted passage). This principle from Adair, a part of the Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), line of cases u ltimately met its demise in West Coast Hotel Co. v,Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937). Following Parrish,in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., the Court
announced that it would uphold economic legislation so long as "it rests upon some
rational basis." 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). As for legislation affecting the political process or
"discrete and insular minorities," the Court explained "[t]here may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality." Id. at 152 n.4. Thus, commenting on
the legacy of Carolene Products, one commentator has suggested there is a difference
between so-called "preferred freedoms" and other somewhat less important freedoms,
with laws limiting the former subjected to a higher level of scrutiny than those affecting
the latter. See MAYER, supra, at 112.
The Supreme Court has constructed a charter of these preferred constitutional
freedoms in its modern substantive due process cases. As the Supreme Court explained in
PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life." 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). This liberty includes the right to privacy,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965), an abortion, Casey, 505 U.S. at 871;
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973), and intimate, consensual, sexual relations,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). As the Court's rejection of Lochner and
its progeny shows, the liberty does not include the right of employer and employee to
freely make employment arrangements. We are left with the seemingly anomalous
conclusion that the Constitution shields from government power a woman's decision to
end her pregnancy, but is silent when it comes to her decision to enter a consensual
employment relationship where she forgoes the right to smoke cigarettes.
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want to be part of a nanny corporation from15enjoying
the full benefits
5
of a corporate health and wellness program.
B.

Waving the White Flag: The Smoker's ProtectionAct Against
CorporateSocial Responsibility
In the fight against tobacco addiction, private employers are an
indispensible ally. As discussed above, private employers are the
primary conduit through which Americans finance their health
insurance.156 Employers take on a financial burden to provide health
insurance to their employees and pay a higher premium for
employees who smoke cigarettes than they do for employees who do
not smoke cigarettes. Due to these cost factors, some employers have
implemented comprehensive health and wellness programs to force
employees to change unhealthy behaviors. These employers gave
their employees a chance to change. If carrots did not work,
employees faced the stick of termination. Since these programs can
help smokers realize the cost of their addiction, they are more likely
to quit smoking.
Consider a hypothetical worker who makes $50,000 per year.
The worker smokes cigarettes. Assume that the extra costs associated
with this particular smoker are $3,000 per year. 57 If an employer
could pass all of that cost along to the smoker, this would amount to
the tobacco user paying an additional $250 per month to fund his
tobacco use. The Smoker's Protection Act, in combination with
federal law, prevents this kind of cost shifting from happening in
North Carolina. Instead, the Act requires private employers to pay

for cigarette smoking under force of law. The Act discourages
innovation in the marketplace and stunts the potential North

Carolina firms have to implement corporate wellness programs that
can improve public health and save money.
155. For example, an employee at Cleveland Clinic-and a thirty-year smokerpraised his employer's decision to implement a no-tobacco policy. Sulzberger, supra note
29. "It's a good idea," the former smoker said. Id. A study of smokers and non-smokers
who worked at a firm with a no-tobacco policy found the workers had positive and
negative reactions to the policy. See Hee Sun Park et al., Employee Responses to the
Implementation of a Smoke Free Workforce Policy: An Interview Study, INT'L J. MGMT.,
Mar. 2011, at 40, 43 ("Interestingly, it was not all non-smokers who had positive reactions:
some smokers also indicated that they thought the policy was good."). Of the twenty
subjects involved in the study, only three identified themselves as "casual or social
smokers." Id. Since the sample size of smokers included in the study was so small, it is not
possible to extrapolate the findings of that study to smokers as a population.
156. See infra Part I.A.
157. Recall that a conservative estimate of the average annual costs associated with
cigarette smoking is $4,570.64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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C. The Free Market for Labor and Voting with Your Feet
If North Carolina repealed the Smoker's Protection Act,
smokers could still bargain with their employers for smoking rights. If
the total economic value of a smoker's contributions as an employee
outweighs the costs of the employee's smoking habit, an employer
might be inclined to tolerate tobacco use. However, the employer
should have the right to exclude tobacco users from the firm and
fashion its employment policy in the way that it sees fit. Likewise, the
employee should have the right to enter into a contractual
relationship with the employer.
Implicit in this freedom is the right to discriminate. Repealing
the Smoker's Protection Act would mean restoring to employers the
right to discriminate among employees and job applicants on the basis
of tobacco use. Of course, the law condemns discrimination on certain
grounds-race, sex, age, and disability, among others.158 Yet if the law
were to forbid discrimination on all grounds, society would essentially
cease to function. We discriminate in who we choose to marry, the
friends we make, the neighborhoods in which we live, and how we
spend our time. The questions that remain then are (1) what are the
permissible grounds for discrimination, and (2) is discrimination
against tobacco users one of these grounds?
In his influential article on the ethics of discrimination in
employment decisions, Alan Wertheimer suggests that there are four
factors to consider in whether one is justified in discriminating on
particular grounds.159 First is "the nature of the preference upon
which [discrimination] is based," particularly whether the grounds
involve "purely innate characteristics."" 6 Second is whether the
discrimination is based on unjustified, irrational "hierarchic beliefs"
about social groups.1 61 Third is whether the members of the excluded
group have been historically disfavored. 162 The fourth consideration is
whether one's reaction to a member of the excluded group is "rooted
163
in developmental patterns."

158. See statutes cited supra note 125 (listing the primary federal anti-discrimination
laws).
159. Alan Wertheimer, Jobs, Qualifications,and Preferences,94 ETHICS 99, 107 (1983).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 107--08 ("[I1f it were a general fact of child development that six-yearolds respond better to female teachers, I believe it would not be unreasonable to attempt
to accommodate that fact in hiring elementary school teachers.").
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Private discrimination against tobacco users is justified on each
of these grounds. First, smoking is not an immutable characteristic.
Thousands of tobacco addicts quit smoking every year. Second, the
beliefs about tobacco users that lead to discrimination are not
irrational. Empirical evidence strongly establishes that tobacco use is
unhealthy and that it imposes significant costs. 164 Third, there is no
history of irrational discrimination against tobacco users as there is
against other groups such as racial and religious minorities. Finally,
discriminating against tobacco users entails no developmental
distinctions. Of course, even if discrimination against tobacco users
was not ethically permissible under Wertheimer's formulation, it does
not necessarily follow that such discrimination should be
circumscribed by the law.165 As the Supreme Court of the United
States itself has repeatedly emphasized, the Constitution mandates
that individuals have the right to make certain controversial choices,
even if those choices are deemed immoral and ethically unacceptable
by legislatures."6
There is no evidence that repealing the Smoker's Protection Act
would essentially eliminate job opportunities for smokers. In its
editorial supporting the Smoker's Protection Act, the Raleigh News
and Observer urged the law was necessary to prevent employers from
creating a "jungle of discriminatory treatment." 167 Yet, in twenty-one
states, this type of discrimination is legal-and has been for some
time-and there are still no widespread reports of unemployment
among smokers."6 Those states, at least in this area, chose to allow
the free market for labor to operate. If a company refused to hire
smokers, tobacco users found work elsewhere.
164. See supra note 51-52 (describing the economic costs of tobacco use).
165. Anti-discrimination laws, including those that forbid private discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, religion, and disability, are anti-libertarian in that they limit freedom of
contract and constrain freedom of association. For an argument for the repeal of antidiscrimination laws, see generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1995) (making a comprehensive
case against race, sex, age, and disability discrimination laws as applied to private
employers).
166. The Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions recognizing the right of
individuals to possess and view pornographic materials present a number of such
examples. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) (holding a state's
criminalization of possession of pornographic material to be a violation of the First
Amendment). So too do the Court's decisions on abortion and intimate relations,
described supra note 154.
167. See Gilding the Golden Leaf,supra note 95.
168. In surveying the literature favoring these statutes, this author found no evidence
on employment differentials between smokers and non-smokers in jurisdictions with a law
like the Smoker's Protection Act as compared to a jurisdiction with no such law.
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If employers overreach, the labor market will respond and adjust
accordingly. Firms can only go as far as the labor market will allow. In
a society with a mobile workforce,169 employees can leave firms to
pursue employment on better terms elsewhere. As Professor
Henderson has pointed out, even in the early twentieth century, a
time when employees had much less mobility in comparison to
today's workforce, workers' ability to find alternative employment
"constrained arbitrary and capricious corporate nannyism."' 7 ° If this
very limited worker mobility was capable of limiting firm discretion
one hundred years ago, modern workers, who can claim the benefit of
modern communication and travel, should be able to do so as well.

Striking the appropriate balance between firm interests and
individual autonomy is a decision best made by free parties in the
labor market, not the North Carolina General Assembly.
D. The Januslike Public Policy of the Smoker's ProtectionAct

North Carolina state government spends a significant amount of
money trying to combat tobacco use.171 The State of North Carolina
spends millions of dollars on public awareness campaigns highlighting

169. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that nearly fifty percent of Americans
between the ages of eighteen and forty-four have held eleven or more jobs in their
lifetimes. See Number of Jobs Held by Individuals From Age 18 to Age 44 in 1978 to 2008
by Educational Attainment, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79r23jobsbyedu.pdf (last visited Dec. 29,
2011). A recent survey found that the median number of years a person was at a single
employer was 4.4 years. See Employee Tenure, January 2010, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100927.htm (last updated Sept. 27,
2010).
170. Henderson, supra note 49, at 1538; see also WATrS, supra note 93, at 224 (noting
that Henry Ford closed down his sociological program, at least in part, due to worker
unrest and resistance from middle management at the Ford Motor Company).
171. The Tobacco-Free Kids Campaign reports that North Carolina will spend $18.3
million in anti-tobacco advocacy in 2011. Tobacco-Free Kids Campaign, Spending on
Tobacco Prevention: North Carolina, TOBACCOFREEKIDS.ORG, http://www
.tobaccofreekids.org/what wedo/statelocal/tobaccosettlement/north_carolina
(last
updated Nov. 29, 2011). These estimates do not include figures for annual Medicaid
spending by the State of North Carolina on tobacco-related diseases, which are likely well
into the millions of dollars annually. See Helen Halpin Schauffler, Dianne C. Barker & C.
Tracy Orleans, Medicaid Coverage for Tobacco-Dependence Treatments, HEALTH
AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 298, 298 ("In 1993 the federal and state governments spent
approximately $12.9 billion under Medicaid treating tobacco-related disease. Individual
State Medicaid spending ranged from a low of $11 million in Wyoming (8.2 percent of
expenditures) to a high of $1.9 billion in New York (10 percent of expenditures)." (citing
L.S. Miller et al., State Estimates of Medicaid Expenditures Attributable to Cigarette
Smoking, Fiscal Year 1993, 113 PUB. HEALTH REP. 140, 145-46 (1998))).
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the health hazards of cigarette smoking. 172 In light of these efforts, the
Smoker's Protection Act compromises the moral authority of the
state in pursuing this public health campaign. The Smoker's
Protection Act sends a contradictory message to North Carolina's
citizens. In some contexts, North Carolina says that cigarette smoking
is dangerous and hazardous to health. In others, North Carolina
claims that cigarette smoking is a protected activity-in essence, a
civil right-and that employers are forbidden from forcing smokers to
pay the costs of their habit. By sending this confusing message, the
Smoker's Protection Act actually helps to undermine the state
government's ability to fight tobacco addiction and promote public
health.
CONCLUSION

As health care costs continue to climb,'73 the issue of smoking
and employment is not likely to go away.174 Already there is a call for
the federal government to step in and set a national policy against
lifestyle discrimination. 17 This proposal for federal legislation uses
the rhetoric of freedom and individual rights, just like the advocates
of the Smoker's Protection Act did in North Carolina. 7 6 Yet the
proposal suffers from the same critical defects as the Smoker's
Protection Act. Under the employment law regime it envisions, it is
true that an employer would no longer be able to be the boss of an

172. See Tobacco-Free Kids Campaign, supra note 171 (reporting that North Carolina
will spend $17.3 million on anti-tobacco advocacy in 2012); see also, e.g., Valonda
Calloway, N.C. Launches Teen Anti-Tobacco TV Campaign, WRAL (Apr. 19, 2004),
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/110149/ (describing an example of a public health
campaign against tobacco).
173. Health care industry analysts expect that an employee's share of health care
expenses will rise by nearly six percent in 2012. See Sandra Block, Employee Health
Insurance Cost Rising Again, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 2011, at B3 (citing estimates from
Tower Watson and Mercer, two human resources consulting firms).
174. For a discussion of the private organizations and public entities that have taken on
this issue recently, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
175. See Ann L. Rives, Note, You're Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle
DiscriminationLegislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553 passim (2006). Federal legislation
is particularly necessary, according to this commentator, in order to allow "an employee to
know what conduct he can and cannot engage in off the clock and to know that these
expectations will not change simply because he decides to move to another state." Id. at
568.
176. See id. at 553 ("[I]magine working for a company where eating [a] hamburger and
drinking [a] beer could cost you your job."); id. at 554 (calling for "federal legislation,
which would curtail private employers' ability to interfere in the off-duty conduct of their
employees and thereby keep employers from infringing on their employees' privacy
rights").
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employee after work hours. Instead, a paternalistic federal
government would sweep in, preventing parties from freely making
an employment agreement on their own terms. In essence then, the
federal government would be the boss. Worse yet, the proposal
further extends the federal government's authority at the expense of
the police powers of the sovereign states and nationalizes
questionable public policy.' 77
The Smoker's Protection Act represents an unjustified intrusion
into the relationship between employer and employee in North
Carolina. The Act maintains the illusion of advancing liberty and
individual autonomy, but actually succeeds in subverting freedom of
contract in the labor market while promoting incoherent public
health policy. It is the architects of this kind of law that nineteenth
century classical liberal Frederic Bastiat might have had in mind when
he wrote: "Too many persons place themselves above mankind; they
'
make a career of organizing it, patronizing it, and ruling it."178
Bastiat's response to the statists of his day is as instructive today as it
was in the nineteenth century. "Let Us Now Try Liberty," he said.179

Now let North Carolina again try liberty.
JAMES RUFFIN LAWRENCE, III**

177. The Tenth Amendment guarantees that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The states are free to legislate in
this area. One can support a repeal of the Smoker's Protection Act while supporting the
right of other states to make their own decisions on this matter.
178. FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 75 (Dean Russell, trans. Found. for Econ. Educ.
2d ed. 4th prtg. 2004) (1850), availableat http://www.fee.org/pdf/books/The-Law.pdf.
179. Id. at 76.
** The author thanks his wife Amy without whose love, support, and encouragement
this Comment would not have been possible. He also thanks Matson Coxe, Jenna Hoeler,
and the rest of the North Carolina Law Review Board of Editors for their editing work, as
well as friends and colleagues inside and outside the law school for helpful thoughts
throughout the development of this Comment.

